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Abstract
This paper explores the mechanisms behind the intergenerational earnings
mobility in Spain by means of three exercises: calculating the transition matrix,
decomposing the sources of earnings elasticity and estimating quantile earnings
regressions. By calculating the transition matrices we find a strong degree of
persistence in educational attainment and especially in occupation. By decom-
posing the sources of earnings elasticity across generations, we find that the
correlation between children’s and their fathers’ occupations is the most impor-
tant component. Finally, quantile regressions estimates show that the influence
of the father’s earnings is greater when we move to the lower tail of the offspring’s
earnings distribution, especially in the case of daughters’ earnings.
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1 Introduction
Intergenerational mobility is a measure of the changes in socioeconomic status that
occur from the parents’ to the children’s generation and can also be seen as an indicator
of equality of opportunity. A society with more intergenerational mobility implies that
the socioeconomic status of children is less determined by the socioeconomic status of
their parents and in this sense we can say that there is greater equality of opportunity.
Intergenerational mobility is generally measured in terms of intergenerational elas-
ticity, or a statistical correlation between parents’ and children’s economic standings.
The higher the intergenerational elasticity, the less social mobility a society offers.
Economists have primarily concentrated on the relationship between parents and their
offspring’s permanent income or earnings, while sociologists explore measures of the
association between ordered categorical variables, such as social and economic class.1
In this paper, we follow the economic approach and focus on intergenerational mo-
bility measured by the intergenerational elasticity of offspring’s earnings with respect
to their fathers’ earnings. The main objective of our paper is to explore the intergen-
erational elasticity of earnings in Spain. We investigate the underlying mechanisms of
this earnings transmission by means of three exercises. First, we calculate the transi-
tion matrices; second, we decompose the sources of earnings elasticity and, finally, we
estimate the influence of fathers’ earnings by quantiles.
Intergenerational mobility in Spain has primarily been studied by sociologists. For
example, Caraban˜a (1999) studied occupational mobility. From an economic point of
view, Sanchez-Hugalde (2004) analyses intergenerational income and education mo-
bility using the Family Expenditure Survey (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares)
for 1980 and 1990; however, she only estimates the elasticity when children and their
parents live together.
More recently, Cervini-Pla´ (2011) provides new evidence on intergenerational earn-
ings and income mobility for Spain. Since there are no Spanish surveys covering long-
term information on both children and their fathers’ income or earnings, she deals
with this selection problem using the two-sample two-stage least squares estimator.
1See Solon (1999), Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (2000), Bowles and Gintis (2002), Erikson and Goldthorpe
(2002) for a review.
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She finds that intergenerational mobility in Spain is similar to France, lower than
in the Nordic countries and Britain and higher than in Italy and the United States.
Furthermore, she uses the Chadwick and Solon (2002) approach to explore intergen-
erational mobility in the case of daughters overcoming employment selection, and she
find similar results by gender.
In order to overcome the co-residence selection problem2, as in Cervini-Pla´ (2011),
we estimate intergenerational earnings mobility using the two-sample two-stage least
squares (TSTSLS) estimator.3 This method combines information from two separate
samples: a sample of adults (sons and daughters) with observations of their earnings
and their parents’ characteristics, and a sample of potential parents with observations
of earnings and the same characteristics. The latter sample is used to estimate an
earnings equation for parents using their characteristics as explanatory variables, while
the former is used to estimate an intergenerational earnings equation by replacing the
missing parental earnings with its best linear prediction.
The second problem we try to correct is the employment selection, wherein we only
have earnings for adults who are employed. Since the decision to work or not work
is not random, especially in the case of women, estimating intergenerational earnings
mobility only for those who are working gives us biased estimators. We deal with this
selection problem using a different approach to that of Cervini-Pla´ (2011); we use the
Heckman-type of correction estimation described in Vella (1998) and used in Ermisch,
Francesconi, and Siedler (2006). Therefore, another contribution of this paper is the
consideration of employment selection in this way.
Correcting for co-residence and empoloyment selection, we find an elasticity of 0.38
for sons between 30 and 40 years and an elasticity of 0.42 for sons between 40 and 50
2Following Nicoletti and Francesconi (2006) we refer to the co-residence selection problem by the
fact that, in a panel, we have information regarding offspring’s and parents’ earnings when they live
together in at least one wave; however, the probability of observing offspring living with their parents
decreases as the children grow older. This selection problem is particularly important in Spain, where
we have only short panels, and thus, we do not have information on both children’s and their fathers’
permanent earnings.
3Following the paper written by Angrist and Krueger (1992) on two-sample instrumental vari-
ables (TSIV) estimation, numerous empirical researchers have applied a computationally convenient
TSTSLS variant to the study of intergenerational mobility, such as Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (1997) in
Sweden; Fortin and Lefebvre (1998) in Canada; Grawe (2004)) in Ecuador, Nepal, Pakistan, and
Peru; Lefranc and Trannoy (2005) in France; Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) in Britain; and by Mocetti
(2007) in Italy.
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years. In the case of daughters, we obtain elasticities of 0.36 and 0.49 respectively.
The high values of the diagonals of our transition matrices show a high degree
of persistence in education and occupation. By decomposing the sources of earnings
correlations, we find that the correlation between children’s and fathers’ occupation is
the most important component. Despite the strong correlation in education between
parents and children, the father’s occupation is a good indicator of his social position
and is better than his education as a predictor of his children’s earnings. Finally,
when we estimate the elasticity between children’s and fathers’ earnings by quantiles,
we find that the influence of the fathers’ earnings is greater when we move to the lower
tail of the distribution, especially in the case of daughters.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we present a
very simple theoretical framework that allows us to understand some of the sources
of earnings transmission between generations. Section 3 describes how we implement
the two-sample two-stage least square estimator. In Section 4 we describe the data
source, the selection sample, and the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section
5 reports the results, and finally, Section 6, concludes with some final remarks.
2 Sources of earnings transmission
Why do some children obtain better jobs and higher earnings when they become adults,
while others do not? Through what channels are earnings transmitted?
As Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) point out, an important number of institutions
affect intergenerational mobility, such as the education system, the labour market and
the family (particularly its investment in children). Furthermore, public policy affects
these institutions and hence intergenerational mobility.
Following Checchi (2006) and Lefranc and Trannoy (2005), we present here a simple
model that allows us to better understand some of the sources of intergenerational
earnings transmission.4
Let us suppose an individual belonging to family i and to generation t, whose
permanent earnings Wit derives from two components: ability endowment Ait, and
4Here we will summarise the main channels of earnings transmission; however, most of these
channels are the same when we analyse the transmission of income.
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human capital (i.e., education Eit). If we do not consider on-the-job training, education
comes before entering employment, and therefore, also comes prior to earnings. If
we consider the fact that ability increases labour productivity, we can express these
channels as follows:
Wit = λEit + piAit + µit (1)
Where for simplicity’s sake, the relationship between earnings, education and abil-
ity is assumed to be linear, and µit is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
error term that captures the idea of luck in the labour market.
Education is one of the most important channels of intergenerational earnings
transmission. Educational attainment can be determined by the cultural influence of
the family. We represent the education of the previous generation by Eit−1 and the
coefficient η shows this channel. There is a large body of empirical evidence about
how the children of educated parents are more likely to acquire education. As Checchi
(2006) points out, this may be partly due to parental imitation, but in most cases, it
works through induced educational choices. An educated parent is more aware of the
psychological and economic value of education, and therefore, puts more pressure on
his or her children to achieve more at school.
Furthermore, in the presence of liquidity constraints, education is also determined
by family earnings, reducing the optimal investment in education by poor families.
We indicate this channel with γ and we write:
Eit = ηEit−1 + γWit−1 (2)
Therefore, education is determined by the education and earnings of the previous
generation; however, if we substitute Eit−1 with the expression with one-period lag
successively we can observe that education depends on the earnings of the parents,
grandparents, and previous generations.
The second component we have in equation 1 is ability. Considering that ability
is genetically (or mechanically) inherited, we can indicate this effect with α, while
t− 1 again represents the previous generation. Ability can influence earnings directly
through the type of job obtained because people with greater ability are more produc-
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tive. Therefore, we have:
Ait = αAit−1 (3)
This component can be considered to reflect some aspects of earnings determinants
that “money can’t buy”, and at the same time, are transmitted from one generation
to the next. Examples of this are the transmission of intelligence quotient (IQ), social
networks, and preferences.
Another source of intergenerational earnings persistence emerges from territorial
segregation. One’s neighbourhood can influence earnings through education (better
quality of schools) or through social capital (good neighbours help obtain better jobs).
Neighbourhoods with better schools and better neighbours generally have higher house
prices. Therefore, residential choices are ultimately determined by family earnings.
Another channel is networks per se. Obtaining a good and well-paid job may
depend on friends and social networks rather than on one’s curriculum.
We consider the combined effect of family networking and residential choices on
offspring’s earnings. Since both components are related to family earnings, we indicate
this channel with θ and extend equation (1) with an additional term:
Wit = λEit + piAit + θWit−1 + µit (4)
Taking into account each of these channels, we can observe that intergenerational
persistence is a dynamic system. From an empirical point of view, it is not easy to
distinguish between alternative explanations of intergenerational persistence of earn-
ings. It is important to note that in a simple regression of child’s earnings on parents’
earnings, the coefficient will simultaneously capture all of the effects “that money can
buy”. Hence, standard estimates of intergenerational earnings regressions will provide
an upward-biased estimates of the causal effect of parents’ earnings on their children’s
earnings. Concretely, we will estimate:
Wit = βWit−1 + µit (5)
However, from a policy point of view, the distinction between the different com-
ponents is relevant in the prediction of the impact of economic policies and in the
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knowledge of which policy could better improve mobility.
3 Estimation method and sample selection prob-
lems
As we explained above, the standard measure of intergenerational mobility is earn-
ings elasticity. More precisely, we consider the following intergenerational mobility
equation:
Wit = α + βWit−1 + µit (6)
where Wit is the offspring’s log earnings, Wit−1 is the fathers’ log earnings (the
earnings of the previous generation), α is the intercept term representing the average
change in the child’s log earnings, and µ is a random error. The coefficient β is
the intergenerational elasticity of offspring’s earnings with respect to their father’s
earnings, and is our parameter of interest.
Children’s earnings are positively related to their fathers’ earnings of parents, there-
fore, the β coefficient varies between 0 and 1. A high value of β implies a high per-
sistence of wages and therefore a less mobile society. Conversely, a value of β close
to zero is representative of a very mobile society where the children’s socioeconomic
status is not strongly influenced by the position of the parents.
If we had permanent income for successive generations in our sample, we would
have no problem with directly estimating equation (6) using the ordinary least squares
estimator. Unfortunately, we do not have this information in one data set.
First, most data sets only provide measures of current earnings and fail to provide
measures of individual permanent income. Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) show
that the use of current earnings as a proxy for permanent earnings leads to downward
OLS estimates of β. Different solutions can be implemented to reduce or eliminate
this bias. If we work with panel data, we can calculate an average of current earnings
over several years as a proxy of permanent income. Another possibility lies in using
instrumental variables to estimate β. In this paper, we estimate father’s earnings
using auxiliary variables. Therefore, the estimated earnings are an average that can
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be considered a proxy of the father’s permanent earnings. In the case of children,
we select adult ages that are as close as possible to the age at which earnings are
similar to permanent income. In particular, Haider and Solon (2006) suggests the use
of offsprings of around 40 years of age.
Second, we only observe earnings for pairs of parents and children when they live
together in at least one wave of the panel. On the contrary, we do not have informa-
tion for sons and daughters who never co-reside with their parents during the panel.
This selection problem is particularly important in short panels and could lead to a
sub-estimation of the offsprings’ earnings, since their living in the parental household
is due to the fact they are still students or they do not have enough income to live
independently. Therefore, this selection problem causes an overestimation of intergen-
erational mobility (an underestimation of the elasticity between parents’ earnings and
offsprings’ earnings).
In this paper we deal with this selection problem by linking two samples and using
the two-sample two-stage least squares estimator (TS2SLS). The TSTSLS estimator
is a computationally easier variant of the two-sample instrumental variable estimator
(2SIV) described by Angrist and Krueger (1992), Arellano and Meghir (1992), and
Ridder and Moffit (2006).5 Concretely, in the two-sample context, unlike the single-
sample situation, the IV and 2SLS estimators are numerically distinct. Inoue and
Solon (2010) derive and compare the asymptotic distributions of the two estimators
and find that the commonly used TSTSLS estimator is more asymptotically efficient
than the TSIV estimator because it implicitly corrects for differences in the distri-
bution of variables between the two samples. They therefore explain that, although
computational simplicity was the original motive that drew applied researchers to use
the TSTSLS estimator instead of the TSIV estimator, it turns out that the TSTSLS
estimator is also theoretically superior.
Since we do not have information about Wit−1, but do have a set of instrumental
variables Z of Wit−1, we can estimate equation (6) in two steps. We consider two
different samples: the first, which we call the main sample, has data on offspring log
earnings, Wit, and characteristics of their fathers, Z, while the second, which we call
5For a detailed description of the properties of this estimator, see Arellano and Meghir (1992),
Angrist and Krueger (1992) and Ridder and Moffit (2006).
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the supplemental sample, has information on fathers’ log earnings, Wt−1, and their
age, education, and occupational characteristics, Z.
In the first step, we use the supplemental sample to estimate a log earnings equation
for fathers using, as explanatory variables, their characteristics, Z, that is:
Wt−1 = Zt−1δ + vi (7)
In the second step, we estimate the intergenerational mobility equation (6) using
the main sample and replacing the unobserved Wit−1 with its predictor,
Ŵit−1 = Zit−1δˆ, (8)
where δˆ represents the coefficients estimated in the first step, and Z represents the
variables observed in the main sample. Thus, we estimate equation (6) by using the
fathers’ imputed earnings.
Wit = α + β(Zit−1δˆ) + ui (9)
The βˆ we obtain is the TSTSLS estimate of intergenerational earnings elasticity.
The standard errors are properly estimated as Murphy and Topel (1985) and Inoue
and Solon (2010) propose. In order to take into account the life-cycle profiles, the
estimation of both equations includes additional controls for individual’s and father’s
ages.
The properties of the two-sample estimator depend on the nature of the instrument
used. Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) express how important it is to choose instrumental
variables that are strongly correlated with the variable to be instrumented. Therefore,
we have to choose the instruments in order for the R2 of the regression be as high as
possible.
Furthermore, consistency requires the error term in the intergenerational mobility
equation to be independent of the instrumental variables or that the instrumental
variables explain perfectly the father’s missing earnings.
As Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) point out, the TSTSLS estimator of the intergen-
erational elasticity could be under- or overestimated when the auxiliary variables are
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endogenous. Moreover, since the instruments we use -paternal educational and occu-
pational characteristics- are likely to be positively related to the sons’ earnings even
after controlling for the fathers’ earnings, the bias is probably positive. Therefore,
the potential endogeneity problem is likely to affect most of the empirical papers on
intergenerational mobility applying 2SIV and TSTSLS estimators.
Finally, another problem arises when we study intergenerational mobility, is the
employment selection wherein we only observe earnings for adults when they are em-
ployed; however, the decision to work or not to work is not random, especially in the
case of women. Therefore, those who are working are a self-selected sample. Estimat-
ing intergenerational earnings mobility exclusively for those who are working yields
biased estimators. We deal with this selection problem in the case of daughters by
using the Heckman-type of correction estimation described in Vella (1998) and used in
Ermisch, Francesconi, and Siedler (2006). In particular, the variables included in the
selection equation are dependent children, marital status, age and father’s earnings.
In all regressions, these are good predictors of participation.
4 Data Sources and Sample Selection Rules
As we explained above, we combine two separate samples to estimate intergenerational
earnings mobility, a main sample and a supplemental sample.
In our case, the main sample is the Survey of Living Conditions (Encuesta de
Condiciones de Vida (ECV)) for the year 2005, that is, the Spanish component of the
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).6
The ECV has annually interviewed a sample of about 14,000 households that are
representative of the Spanish households, and has kept each household in the sample
for four years. Personal interviews are conducted at approximately one-year intervals
with adult members of all the households.
From the ECV, we have information about adults’ earnings and a set of character-
istics of their fathers when they were between 12 and 14 years old.
6The EU-SILC is an instrument that aims to collect timely and comparable cross-sectional and
longitudinal multidimensional microdata on income, poverty, social exclusion, and living conditions.
This instrument is anchored in the European Statistical System (ESS).
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Our supplemental sample is the Family Expenditure Survey of 1980-1981 (Encuesta
de Presupuestos Familiares). This survey was designed with the purpose of estimat-
ing consumption and the weights of the different goods used in the consumer price
index. In addition, we also have information regarding earnings, occupation, and the
education level of the head of the household. Therefore, in this sample we have data
on the father’s earnings and the same set of their characteristics that are available in
the main sample.
Although we have the same characteristics in both samples, we have to recode some
variables to have a homogenous classification across surveys.7
Our main sample is composed of individuals, either the head of the household or
their spouse, born between 1955 and 1975, self-employed or in paid employment, who
report positive labour earnings and are full-time workers. Thus, in the year 2005,
these adults were between 30 and 50 years old and were 12 or 14 years old between
1969 and 1989. This is why we use the Family Expenditure Survey of 1980-1981 as
the supplemental sample to estimate fathers’ earnings.
We suppose that when the children were 12 or 14 years old, their fathers were
between 37 and 57 years old. Thus, when we estimate the fathers’ earnings regression
we select males between those ages.
As we have mentioned above, one problem that can bias intergenerational mobility
studies is measurement error with regard to earnings. Theoretically, we would like
to consider the intergenerational elasticity in long-run permanent earnings, but we
can observe earnings only in a single or a few specific years. Thus, the question is, at
what age should the current earnings should be observed in order to provide the closest
measure of permanent earnings? Haider and Solon (2006) show that it is reasonable to
choose sons around the age of 40 and fathers with aged between 31 and 55. Therefore,
assuming that these results hold for other countries, we choose similar age intervals in
our empirical application.
After the exclusions, we have a total of 4,352 pairs, and in this sample, we have
employed fathers and children that reported positive earnings.
The earnings variable we use in all the specifications is the log of current gross
7For a detailed description of the frequencies of the different characteristics in the main and
supplemental samples see Table A.1 in the Appendix.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Sons in the main sample after exclusions.
sons 30-40 sons 40-50
Observations 1,334 1,322
annual earnings 19,728.35 22,403.7
log of annual earnings 9.72 9.84
Education
Primary education 13.49% 19.48%
Secondary education (first step) 24.47% 25.00%
Secondary education (second step) 25.42% 24.59%
Vocational qualification 2.64% 1.73%
Higher education (university) 33.97% 29.21%
Occupation
Higher-grade professionals 5.01% 6.6%
Higher-grade manager 11.65% 10.94%
Low grade professional 12.06% 9.97%
Routine non-manual employees high grade 7.99% 10.80%
Routine non-manual employees low grade 10.98% 9.28%
Skilled agriculture workers 2.37% 3.09%
Skilled manual workers 23.51% 22.70%
Low grade technician 12.33% 13.69%
Unskilled workers 14.09% 12.93%
annual earnings, which is almost directly collected (not imputed), and is not distorted
by the national taxation system.
Tables 1 and 2 present the main descriptive statistics of our final sample of sons
and daughters, respectively.
5 Results
5.1 Intergenerational earnings elasticity
In this subsection, we present the empirical results for intergenerational mobility es-
timation correcting for the sample selection problems. As we have explained before,
we use a two-sample two-stage estimation, whose first step consists of the estimation
of the fathers’ earnings regression using the supplemental sample. The results of this
regression are presented in the Appendix (Table A.2). These coefficients are then used
to impute the fathers’ earnings in the main sample, since we have the same characteris-
tics in both samples (main and supplemental). Therefore, in the second step, using the
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Daughters in the main sample after exclusions
daughters 30-40 daughters 40-50
Observations 875 821
annual earnings 13,539.65 15,584.45
log of annual earnings 9.2 9.31
Education
Primary education 10.39% 17.44%
Secondary education (first step) 19.95% 21.54%
Secondary education (second step) 21.78% 23.35%
Vocational qualification 2.35% 1.11%
Higher education (university) 45.52% 36.67%
Occupation
Higher-grade professionals 1.59% 1.96%
Higher-grade manager 17.44% 19.54%
Low grade professional 11.68% 9.90%
Routine non-manual employees high grade 21.76% 16.89%
Routine non-manual employees low grade 21.08% 19.80%
Skilled agriculture workers 0.91% 0.85%
Skilled manual workers 4.85% 5.38%
Low grade technician 2.35% 1.71%
Unskilled workers 18.35% 23.98%
coefficients from the supplemental sample and the characteristics of the main sample,
we estimate earnings for each father in the main sample.
Table 3 reports the second step, the coefficients of the intergenerational regression
between annual children’s earnings (sons and daughters) and the fathers’ imputed
earnings correcting for the co-residence selection problem and employment selection
in the case of daughters.
The increase in female labour force participation in Spain began at the end of the
70s, but this participation is still lower compared to men. It is intuitive that full-
Table 3: Intergenerational elasticity correcting for the sample selection problems
sons 30-40 sons 40-50 daughters 30-40 daughters 40-50
father’s earnings 0.380 0.427 0.369 0.498
(0.042) (0.041) (0.074) (0.062)
Obs. 1334 1322 875 821
R2 0.061 0.08 0.072 0.10
Note:Dependant variable is log of annual labor earnings. Fathers’ earnings refers to the log of father annual labor
earnings. Standard errors are corrected using Murphy and Topel (1985) and Inoue and Solon (2010) procedure.
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time women workers are probably more common in some types of household (highly
educated households or very poor households). We use the variables of being married,
having children, and the father’s earnings and age to correct for the employment
selection.
In all columns, the father’s predicted log earnings has a significant positive effect
on child’s earnings.
We estimate the elasticity for sons and daughters for two different cohorts, those
aged between 30 and 40 and those between 40 and 50 in 2005. For sons (first and
second columns), regression coefficients are 0.38 for the first cohort and 0.43 for the
second cohort. In the case of daughters (third and fourth columns), the elasticities
are 0.37 and 0.50, respectively. The elasticities differences between genders are not
statistically significant and we can therefore say that the persistence of earnings is
nearly the same by gender.
We observe smaller correlations for the younger cohorts. However we do not have
enough information to know whether this is due to a changing trend in that there is
greater mobility or whether this is only a matter of age in the sense that when these
young sons grow older they become more correlated with their parents.
The figure of intergenerational earnings elasticity per se does not give much in-
formation. It is always useful to compare our estimates of intergenerational earnings
mobility in Spain with the results obtained for other countries. However, we must
be careful because the comparability of studies is problematic and very difficult since
the estimates are sensitive to different factors such as the income measure used, the
adequacy of the database, the different criteria for sample selection and the different
estimation methods followed. Therefore, we must choose the studies that are most
similar to ours in terms of choice of sample, using a two-sample approach.
In Table 4 we present the elasticities for different studies using the two-sample
approach. As we can see, our elasticities are similar to those found in Cervini-Pla´
(2011) and show that Spain has similar economic mobility to France, higher than Italy
and Brazil and lower than the Nordic countries, Canada and UK. The case of the U.S.
is interesting because, contrary to popular belief, it has a high persistence of earnings.
As Lefranc and Trannoy (2005) point out, one possible explanation for why Europe
shows more intergenerational mobility than the United States is the way in which
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Table 4: Comparable international elasticities
Studies: Country βˆ Set of instruments
Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (1997) Sweden 0.28 Education, occupation
Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (1997) US 0.52 Education, occupation
Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) UK 0.29 Occupational prestige
Mocetti (2007) Italy 0.50 Education, occupation
Piraino (2007) Italy 0.51 Education, work status
Lefranc and Trannoy (2005) France 0.41 Education, social class
Dunn (2007) Brazil 0.69 Education
Ferreira and Veloso (2006) Brazil 0.58 Education, occupation
Cervini-Pla´ (2011) Spain 0.41 Education, occupation
Fortin and Lefebvre (1998) Canada 0.21 Occupation
Note:The β is the father-son earnings elasticity. The dependent variable is log annual son’s earnings.
higher education is financed.
Once we have estimated elasticities in the next subsections, as explained before,
we shall explore intergenerational mobility by means of three exercises that we present
in the following three sections.
5.2 Transition matrices
Another way to characterize intergenerational mobility is using mobility matrices.
The idea is to characterize the conditional probabilities of transition between ordered
groups. Table 5 gives the fraction of sons or daughters in each earnings quantile given
the earnings quantile of their fathers. Each cell in Table 5 can be interpreted as the
probability of a son or daughter being in quantile ith, conditional on his or her father
being in quantile jth.
Table 5: Transition matrices of earnings between fathers and child
Quantil of child
1 2 3 4 5
Quantil of
father
1 30.08% 24.40% 19.12% 15.74% 10.66%
2 23.93% 22.34% 23.54% 15.69% 14.50%
3 16.98% 19.17% 20.26% 22.64% 20.95%
4 16.20% 18.29% 21.67% 23.26% 20.58%
5 13.23% 16.20% 15.66% 22.41% 32.49%
We note strong persistence at the extremes of the distribution. About 30 % of
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children remain in the bottom quintile of the earnings distribution if their father
belongs to that quantile. The value is also high at the other extrem of the distribution,
about 32.49% of the children of richer fathers are also in the richest quantile. Although
we observe more mobility in the center of the distribution, high diagonal values of the
matrix indicate high persistence of earnings throughout the distribution.
Education obviously plays a crucial role in understanding intergenerational mo-
bility. Therefore, in Table 6 we present the transition matrix of education between
fathers and children. It is observed that the generation of children is on average more
educated than that of their parents. However, the values found in the diagonal are
even higher than the earnings’ transition matrix, indicating greater educational im-
mobility. For example, around 74% of children with educated fathers are remain in
the same group.
Table 6: Transition matrix of education between fathers and children
Father/ Child 1 2 3 4
1 23.73% 28.52% 24.34% 23.42%
2 4.44% 25.23% 34.58% 35.75%
3 3.37% 9.21% 35.28% 52.13%
4 0.57% 4.82% 20.71% 73.90%
Note:1:none or primary school, 2:lower secondary, 3:upper secondary, 4:university degree.
In Spain, as in other southern European countries, children leave the parental home
at a very late age. Therefore, most of the school decisions are made when they still
live with their parents, a fact that reinforces the influence of parents on children.
Furthermore, cost dimension is also important in understanding schooling deci-
sions. In Spain, access to public tertiary education is not extremely expensive. How-
ever, universtity fees only represent a small proportion of annual expenditure in order
to attend university, clearly the greatest cost is the opportunity cost of not working
and this cost is particularly important in low income families.
Spain is also characterized by strong occupational persistence. Table 7 shows how
occupations are linked across generations. Again, the high values of the diagonal of
the matrix, even higher than in the education matrix, show that a high proportion of
children have the same occupations as their parents. Intergenerational occupational
immobility is linked with the existence of entry barriers limiting access to certain
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professions. Furthermore, in other cases, it is the natural result of educational strati-
fication. Finally, another channel through which persistence in occupations works are
family ties, for many jobs are filled through social referral.
Table 7: Transition matrix of occupations between fathers and children
Father/ Child 1 2 3 4
1 33.40% 40.61% 9.32% 16.67%
2 15.39% 50.11% 12.15% 22.35%
3 7.07% 24.08% 26.44% 42.41%
4 6.70% 20.82% 16.30% 56.17%
Note:1:unskilled workers, 2:skilled agriculture and manual workers, 3:low grade professionals, 4:higher grade
professionals and managers.
Both the education and occupation matrices show that that major education and
occupation immobility lies behind the strong persistence of earnings.
5.3 Decomposing earnings elasticity
The second exercise we perform to explore intergenerational mobility is a decomposi-
tion of the sources of earnings elasticity across generations. Using the decomposition
developed by Bowles and Gintis (2002) and followed by Lefranc and Trannoy (2005),
we can express offsprings’ and fathers’ earnings as:
Wit = Educ
c
i δ
c
educ +Occup
c
i δ
c
occup + µ
c
i for children
′s earnings (10)
Wit−1 = Educ
f
i δ
f
educ +Occup
f
i δ
f
occup + µ
f
i for father
′s earnings (11)
where the supra-indices c and f are used to identify children’s and fathers’ charac-
teristics respectively. The variable Educ is the individual’s education, while Occup is
the individual’s occupation; these are the variables we have used to estimate fathers
earnings in the supplemental sample.8
Thus, the elasticity β is simply given by:
8In order to provide an easy exposition, the variable age is ignored here; however, it is taken into
account in the empirical implementation of the decomposition.
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β =
cov(Wit , Educ
f
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f
educ +Occup
f
i δ
f
occup)
V (Educfi δ
f
educ +Occup
f
i δ
f
occup)
Then, we can rewrite β as a decomposition of six terms:
β =
1
V (Educfi δ
f
educ +Occup
f
i δ
f
occup)
×
[
δceduccov(Educ
c
i , Educ
f
i )δ
f
educ
+ δcoccupcov(Occup
c
i , Occup
f
i )δ
f
occup + δ
c
educcov(Educ
c
i , Occup
f
i )δ
f
occup
+ δcoccupcov(Occup
c
i , Educ
f
i )δ
f
educ + cov(µ
c
i , Educ
f
i )δ
f
educ + cov(µ
c
i , Occup
f
i )δ
f
occup
]
Bowles and Gintis (2002) remark that it is important to consider this decomposition
as a descriptive device and not as an analysis of causal effects.
The results of applying this decomposition to the estimation of earnings elasticity
presented in Table 3 are given in table 8
Table 8: Decomposition of earnings regression coefficient
sons 30-40 sons 40-50 daughters 30-40 daughters 40-50
educc − educf 0.065 0.084 0.059 0.080
occupc − occupf 0.143 0.152 0.139 0.173
educc − ocupf 0.080 0.082 0.073 0.096
occupc − educf 0.055 0.071 0.063 0.093
resc − educf 0.002 0.018 0.014 0.018
resc − occupf 0.035 0.020 0.023 0.038
total 0.380 0.427 0.369 0.498
As Lefranc and Trannoy (2005) observe, these results can be interpreted as, as-
suming that the only channel of intergenerational earnings correlation would work
through the correlation of the fathers’ and children’s education, meaning that the
elasticity coefficient for sons between 30 and 40 and their fathers’ earnings would be
equal 0.065.
Table 8 shows that, for all ages and for both sons and daughters, the correla-
tion between children’s and fathers’ occupations is the most important component
for understanding the intergenerational elasticity between earnings. Furthermore, the
correlation between the father’s occupation and his offspring’s education is also im-
portant. If we add the influence of the father’s occupation on his child’s occupation
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and education, we explain almost half of the intergenerational elasticity coefficient.
However, we can observe a slight contribution of the father’s education. This should
not be surprising, since the fathers in our sample, who now have adult children, have
lower educational levels than their offspring do. Therefore, their occupations are prob-
ably better than their education as indicators of their social position for predicting
their children’s earnings. These results are in line with those obtained by Lefranc and
Trannoy (2005) in the decomposition for France and by O¨sterbacka (2001) for Finland.
They find that the most important component of the intergenerational correlation in
earnings is the correlation between fathers’ and children’s social positions.
5.4 Quantile regressions
When we regress the children’s earnings on their father’s earnings we provide a mea-
sure of intergenerational mobility at the mean; however, it could be interesting to
explore whether this correlation is similar or different at different points of the earn-
ings distribution. If we have homoscedasticity, the coefficient estimated at each per-
centile will not be statistically different to the coefficient at the mean; however, in the
presence of heteroscedasticity, we can obtain different coefficients. After testing the
heteroscedasticity with the white test in our sample, we reject the null hypothesis of
homoscedasticity.9 Therefore, as our third exercise it could be interesting to estimate
quantile regressions.
Are poor sons and daughters less or more determined by their father’s earnings?
If low-paid children are more influenced by their father’s earnings than children with
higher salaries, then the intergenerational elasticity at the mean gives us an incomplete
picture of the correlation between fathers’ and children’s earnings
By estimating quantile regressions, we have a more complete picture of intergenera-
tional transmission of earnings because we have information on the correlation between
children’s and parents’ earnings at different points of the distribution of the children’s
earnings.10
Mean regressions explain how the conditional mean of the children’s earnings de-
9The results of this exercise are available from the author.
10Quantile regression is a statistical technique introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) that
allows us to estimate conditional functions by quantiles, at different points of the distribution.
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Table 9: Intergenerational mobility by quantiles
Average 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
sons 30-40 0.380 0.428 0.339 0.391 0.356 0.394
(0.042) (0.109) (0.762) (0.032) (0.059) (0.067)
sons 40-50 0.427 0.656 0.435 0.468 0.502 0.485
(0.042) (0.107) (0.059) (0.044) (0.044) (0.051)
daughters 30-40 0.369 0.813 0.691 0.409 0.346 0.281
(0.074) (0.212) (0.124) (0.108) (0.065) (0.056)
daughters 40-50 0.498 0.938 0.864 0.624 0.541 0.410
(0.062) (0.177) (0.064) (0.067) (0.081) (0.069)
Note: Standard error for the estimated coefficients are in parenthesis and are corrected using Murphy and Topel (1985)
and Inoue and Solon (2010) procedure. Average refers to mean regression, whereas q-th indicates the q-th percentile
regression.
pend on parents’ earnings; however, quantile regressions explain how children’s earn-
ings depend on parental earnings at each specific quantile of the conditional distribu-
tion of the children’s earnings, given the fathers’ earnings.
In Table 9, we can observe the coefficient of the father’s log earnings at different
points of the children’s earnings distribution. In the first column, we present the
mean regression, which shows how important fathers’ earnings are on average. In
the other columns, quantile regressions evaluate the influence of fathers’ earnings at
each specific quantile. We consider the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles.
We can observe that the influence of fathers’ earnings is greater as we move to the
poorest quantiles of the distribution. Thus, mobility is lower for the children born in
disadvantaged families. This pattern is particularly observed in the case of daughters,
where we can observe a monotonic decrease in the elasticity between fathers’ and
daughters’ earnings as we move to the richer percentiles. The results are in-line with
those obtained by Nicoletti (2008) for fathers’ and daughters’ occupations in Britain.
For sons, we obtain the highest elasticity at the 10th percentile. Thus, we also observe
low mobility for poor sons. However, when we move to richer percentiles the pattern
is no longer monotonic, and the coefficients are fairly close to each other and similar
to the coefficients in the mean regression.
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6 Final remarks
In this paper we examine the intergenerational earnings mobility in Spain with the
help of transition matrices, a decomposion of the earnings elasticity and by quantile
regressions.
We combine the two samples using the two-sample two-stage least squares estimator
in order to correct the co-residence selection problem and we correct the employment
selection with the Heckman selection model.
We find an elasticity of 0.38 for sons between 30 and 40 years of age, an elasticity
of 0.42 for sons between 40 and 50 years of age. In the case of daughters, we obtain
elasticities of 0.36 and 0.49, respectively.
Our transition matrices of education and occupation show a high degree of persis-
tence, especially in the case of occupation. By decomposing the sources of earnings
correlations, we find that the correlation between children’s and fathers’ occupation is
the most important component for understanding the intergenerational elasticity be-
tween earnings. Furthermore, the correlation between fathers’ occupations and their
offspring’s education is also important. Adding the influence of fathers’ occupation
on their children’s occupation and education, we explain almost half of the intergen-
erational elasticity coefficient. This should not be surprising since the fathers in our
sample, who now have adult children, have a lower educational level than their off-
spring. So, their occupations are probably better than their education as indicators of
their social position for predicting their children’s earnings.
Finally, estimating the elasticity between children’s and fathers’ earnings by quan-
tiles, we find that the influence of the father’s earnings is greater when we move to
the lower tail of the distribution, especially for daughters’ earnings. Thus, mobility is
lower for the children born to disadvantaged families.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Distribution of father’s education and occupation an coincidences between
supplemental and main sample
supplemental sample main sample
Observation 5,032 4,352
Education
No finish primary education 23.82 20.09
Primary education 51.28 57.65
Secondary education (first step) 8.46 6.08
Secondary education (second step) 5.90 5.84
Vocational qualification 2.07 0.49
Higher education (university) 8.47 9.85
Occupation
Higher grade professionals 9.25 8.04
Higher grade manager 4.28 3.70
Low grade professional 3.43 5.58
Routine non-manual employees high grade 11.04 6.18
Routine non-manual employees low grade 9.85 7.25
Skilled agriculture workers 12.74 12.85
Skilled manual workers 15.88 24.99
Lower-grade technician 13.81 11.82
Unskilled workers 19.71 19.60
Note: All frequencies are weighted using the respective sampling weights.
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Table A.2: First step: estimates of father’s earnings equation with the supplemental
sample
Dependent variable log father’s earnings
age 0.0571 (0.0211)
age square -0.0006 (0.0002)
Education
Primary education 0.1873 (0.0148)
Secondary education (first step) 0.3919 (0.0276)
Secondary education (second step) 0.5254 (0.0326)
Vocational qualification 0.5581 (0.0487)
Higher education (university) 0.8455 (0.0281)
Occupation
Higher grade manager -0.4381 (0.0404)
Low grade professional -0.0753 (0.0986)
Routine non-manual employees high grade -0.0913 (0.0279)
Routine non-manual employees low grade -0.3158 (0.0320)
Skilled agriculture workers -0.8155 (0.0306)
Skilled manual workers -0.1395 (0.0300)
Lower-grade technician -0.2009 (0.0298)
Unskilled workers -0.3177 (0.0285)
Constant 11.9961 (0.4918)
Obs 5929
R2 0.402
Note: standard errors in parentheses. In Education: none (reference) and in Occupation: Higher-grade professionals
(reference).
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